---
title: "Changed bank details on an invoice: catch it before paying"
description: "How payment diversion fraud works, the warning signs on an invoice, and the control that stops it: compare the account with the record and verify by call-back."
url: https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/changed-bank-details-on-invoices
language: en
updated: 2026-11-16
alternate_de: https://www.cureman.de/de/artikel/geaenderte-bankverbindung-auf-rechnungen.md
---

# Changed bank details on an invoice: catch it before paying

> When an invoice from a known supplier names a new bank account, treat it as unverified until the supplier has confirmed the change through a channel you already had. Payment diversion works by getting a genuine-looking invoice or a notice of new bank details in front of accounts payable, so that a real debt is paid into a fraudster's account. The control has two parts. Compare the IBAN on every invoice with the account on record and on earlier invoices. On a mismatch, hold the payment and call a known contact on a number from your own records.

An invoice from a known supplier that names a new bank account must not be paid, and the supplier record must not be changed, until the supplier has confirmed the new account through a channel you had before the invoice arrived. The change may be genuine. Companies do switch banks. But the same pattern is how payment diversion fraud arrives, and from the document alone the two cannot be told apart.

## How payment diversion works

The fraudster does not need to invent a debt. They use one that exists.

1. They find out that your company owes a supplier money. A common source is a mailbox they can read, at the supplier or at your company, or an invoice that went astray.
2. They send a message in the supplier's name: a copy of the real invoice with a different IBAN, a "corrected invoice", or a letter announcing new bank details. The sender's address is the real one if the mailbox is compromised, or a look-alike domain that differs by one character.
3. Accounts payable updates the supplier record or pays the invoice as printed.
4. The money is moved on quickly. The real supplier sends a reminder weeks later, and only then does anyone notice.

The debt to the real supplier remains. The loss is the full invoice amount, not a difference.

## Warning signs

| Sign | Why it matters |
| --- | --- |
| An IBAN that no earlier invoice of this supplier carried | The core signal; everything else is supporting evidence |
| The account is in another country than the supplier | The first two letters of the IBAN are the country code |
| The account holder's name differs from the supplier's name | A private person or an unrelated company as payee |
| The notice asks for urgency or discretion | Pressure is meant to prevent the call-back |
| A "corrected" invoice whose only change is the account | Real corrections change amounts, dates or lines |
| The reply address or domain differs slightly from earlier mails | Look-alike domains are registered for this purpose |
| The change arrives shortly before a large payment is due | The sender knows your payment run |

None of these proves fraud, and a careful forgery shows only the first one. That is why the control rests on the first one.

## The control: compare with the account on record

The comparison is mechanical and belongs on every invoice, as one of the six checks of the [invoice audit checklist](https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/invoice-audit-checklist).

1. Normalise the IBAN: remove spaces, upper case.
2. Compare it with the account in the supplier record and with the accounts on the supplier's earlier invoices.
3. If it matches the established account, the check passes.
4. If it is an account that no earlier invoice used, hold the payment and start the verification below.

An account counts as established when several earlier invoices agree on it. With a new supplier there is nothing to compare, so the first account is verified when the supplier is set up, by the same call-back.

One rule matters more than the others: **never let an incoming invoice overwrite the account on record.** If the record updates itself from the latest document, the control removes itself at the exact moment it is needed.

## Verify by call-back

- **Use a number you already have.** From the contract, from your own supplier record, or from a business card of the account manager. Not the number on the invoice, in the email signature or in the letter announcing the change.
- **Speak to a person you know**, or go through the supplier's switchboard and ask for accounts receivable.
- **Ask an open question.** "Which account should we be paying into?" tells you more than "Is the new account ending in 4471 correct?".
- **Record it**: who called whom, when, on which number, and what was said.
- **Separate the duties.** The person who verifies is not the person who changes the record, and a second person releases the change.

Many companies add a waiting period: a changed account becomes payable only some days after the change, which gives the real supplier time to notice a diverted notice.

Since 2025, payment service providers in the euro area have to offer a verification of the payee before a credit transfer in euro is authorised: the payer is warned when the name does not match the IBAN ([Regulation (EU) 2024/886](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/886/oj)). Use it, and do not rely on it alone. It compares a name with an account. Whether that account is your supplier's is a question only the supplier can answer.

## If the payment has already gone out

Minutes count, because the money is forwarded quickly.

1. Call your bank at once and ask for a recall of the transfer. Give the amount, date and receiving IBAN.
2. Inform the real supplier and agree how the open invoice will be handled.
3. Report the case to the police and, if you have one, to your crime or cyber insurer. Insurers set deadlines for notification.
4. Secure the evidence: the message with full headers, the invoice file, the change log of the supplier record.
5. Check whether the fraudster had access to a mailbox on your side, and whether other suppliers received similar messages.

## What goes wrong

- **Confirming by reply.** A reply to the message goes to the person who sent it.
- **Checking only when something looks odd.** A good forgery does not look odd. The comparison runs on every invoice.
- **Treating a "resent" invoice as a duplicate and paying the newer one.** A second copy with a different account is not a [duplicate](https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/detect-duplicate-invoices); it is this case.
- **Assuming the format protects.** A structured [e-invoice](https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/e-invoices-xrechnung-zugferd) carries the payee account as a field, and the field holds whatever the sender wrote.

## How Cureman does it

Cureman reads the IBAN from every invoice: from the payee field of an e-invoice, or from the document when a model reads a PDF. It compares the account with those on the same supplier's earlier invoices. When an invoice of the last 90 days names an account that no earlier invoice used, and at least two earlier invoices agree on another account, it raises a finding: verify the new account before paying. The finding shows the known and the new account in masked form and the number of earlier invoices with the known one, and it tells the reader to confirm with a known contact by phone, not by replying to the invoice. It carries no amount, because nothing has been saved or lost yet; it is an action item for a person.

The account stored for a supplier is never overwritten by a later invoice; only a person changes it. If the invoice was read by a model and has not been reviewed, the finding carries lower confidence, since a misread digit looks like a new account. Cureman does not make or block payments and does not know whether an invoice was paid, so the finding has to reach the person who releases the payment run. The module is described under [invoice audit and spend analysis](https://www.cureman.de/en/modules/invoice-audit-and-spend-analysis).

## Questions and answers

### What should you do when an invoice shows new bank details?

Hold the payment and leave the supplier record as it is. Call a contact you already know at the supplier, on a number from your own records or the contract, and ask whether the account has changed. Only after that confirmation, recorded with name, date and time, should a second person change the record. Never confirm by replying to the invoice or by calling a number printed on it.

### How does payment diversion fraud work?

A fraudster learns that you owe a supplier money, often by reading a compromised mailbox on either side. They send an invoice or a letter in the supplier's name that looks right in every detail except the bank account. You pay a real debt into the wrong account, and the real supplier still expects its money.

### Does the bank's check of payee name against IBAN stop this fraud?

It helps and it is not sufficient. Banks in the euro area have to offer a verification of the payee's name against the IBAN before a credit transfer is authorised. It warns when the name does not match. It does not tell you whether an account in a plausible name belongs to your supplier, and a warning can be clicked away under time pressure. The comparison with your own records stays necessary.

### Can a structured e-invoice carry false bank details?

Yes. An e-invoice is well-formed data, and the payee account is simply one of its fields. A file that passes every format validation can name an account that is not the supplier's. The comparison with the account on record applies to e-invoices exactly as to PDFs.

## The module that does this

[Invoice audit and spend analysis: every invoice read and checked](https://www.cureman.de/en/modules/invoice-audit-and-spend-analysis): The module takes invoices as PDFs, e-invoices or CSV, checks each line against its arithmetic, earlier invoices and agreed prices, and adds up the spend.

## Read next

- [Invoice audit checklist: what to check on every invoice](https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/invoice-audit-checklist): Six checks for every supplier invoice before it is paid: formal details, arithmetic, price, duplicate, billing period and bank details, each with its rule.
- [How to detect duplicate invoices before and after payment](https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/detect-duplicate-invoices): Matching rules for exact and near duplicate invoices: normalised invoice numbers, amount and date, credit notes, and what to do once a duplicate is found.
- [E-invoices: XRechnung, ZUGFeRD and what changes for checks](https://www.cureman.de/en/articles/e-invoices-xrechnung-zugferd): What an e-invoice is under EN 16931, how XRechnung, ZUGFeRD, Factur-X and Peppol differ, what German VAT law requires, and which invoice checks change.
